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Abstract: Conservation scientists are increasingly focusing on the drivers of human behavior and on the
implications of various sources of uncertainty for management decision making. Trophy hunting has been
suggested as a conservation tool because it gives economic value to wildlife, but recent examples show that
overharvesting is a substantial problem and that data limitations are rife. We use a case study of trophy
hunting of an endangered antelope, the mountain nyala (Tragelaphus buxtoni), to explore how uncertainties
generated by population monitoring and poaching interact with decision making by 2 key stakeholders: the
safari companies and the government. We built a management strategy evaluation model that encompasses
the population dynamics of mountain nyala, a monitoring model, and a company decisionmaking model. We
investigated scenarios of investment into antipoaching andmonitoring by governments and safari companies.
Harvest strategy was robust to the uncertainty in the population estimates obtained from monitoring, but
poaching had a much stronger effect on quota and sustainability. Hence, reducing poaching is in the interests
of companies wishing to increase the profitability of their enterprises, for example by engaging community
members as game scouts. There is a threshold level of uncertainty in the population estimates beyond which
the year-to-year variation in the trophy quota prevented planning by the safari companies. This suggests a role
for government in ensuring that a baseline level of population monitoring is carried out such that this level
is not exceeded. Our results illustrate the importance of considering the incentives of multiple stakeholders
when designing frameworks for resource use and when designing management frameworks to address the
particular sources of uncertainty that affect system sustainability most heavily.
Keywords: adaptive management, conflict, harvesting, natural resources, social-ecological system, socioeco-
nomics, sustainability
Incentivando el Monitoreo y el Cumplimiento en la Caza de Trofeos
Resumen: Cient´ıficos conservacionistas cada vez se enfocan ma´s en los conductores del comportamiento
humano y en las implicaciones de varias fuentes de incertidumbre en la toma de decisiones de manejo. La
cacer´ıa de trofeos ha sido sugerida como una herramienta de conservacio´n porque le otorga valor econo´mico
a la vida silvestre, pero ejemplos recientes muestran que la sobrecolecta es un problema sustancial y que las
limitaciones de datos son abundantes. Usamos el estudio de caso de la cacer´ıa de trofeos de un ant´ılope en
peligro, el nyala de las montan˜as (Tragelaphus buxtoni), para explorar como las incertidumbres generadas
por el monitoreo de poblaciones y el tra´fico de especies interactu´an con la toma de decisiones de 2 actores
clave: las compan˜ı´as de safari y el gobierno. Construimos un modelo de evaluacio´n de estrategia de manejo
que incluye la dina´mica poblacional del nyala de las montan˜as, un modelo de monitoreo y un modelo de
toma de decisiones de una compan˜ı´a. Investigamos escenarios de inversio´n en el combate del tra´fico de
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especies y el monitoreo por el gobierno y las compan˜ı´as de safari. La estrategia de colecta fue robusta hacia
la incertidumbre en los estimados de poblacio´n obtenidos del monitoreo, pero el tra´fico de especies tuvo un
efecto ma´s fuerte sobre la cuota y la sustentabilidad; por esto, reducir el tra´fico de especies esta´ dentro de
los intereses de compan˜ı´as que desean incrementar la rentabilidad de las empresas, por ejemplo al hacer
participar a los miembros de la comunidad como guı´as de caza. Hay un nivel umbral de incertidumbre en
los estimados de poblacio´n ma´s alla´ del cual la variacio´n anual en la cuota de trofeos previene la planeacio´n
por parte de las compan˜ı´as de safari. Esto sugiere un papel para el gobierno asegurando que un nivel base
de monitoreo de poblacio´n se lleve a cabo para que este nivel no sea excedido. Nuestros resultados ilustran
la importancia de considerar los incentivos de partes interesadas mu´ltiples al designar marcos de trabajo
para el uso de recursos y que al designar marcos de trabajo de manejo dirigirse a las fuentes particulares de
incertidumbre que afecten ma´s al sistema de sustentabilidad.
Palabras Clave: colecta, conflicto, manejo adaptativo, recursos naturales, sistema socio-ecolo´gico, socioe-
conomı´a, sustentabilidad
Introduction
Trophy hunting has been advocated as a tool for bio-
diversity conservation because it provides monetary in-
centives for conservation. Three main arguments have
been put forward in support of this stance on trophy
hunting: it provides economic incentives for sustainable
offtake (Lindsey et al. 2007); it turns land into conser-
vation areas, for example over 1.3 million km2 in sub-
Saharan Africa is used for trophy hunting, which is more
than state land provided for wildlife (Lindsey et al. 2006);
and it can finance reintroductions, for example black
wildebeest (Connochaetus gnou) and southern white
rhino (Ceratotherium simum simum) in South Africa
(Leader-Williams et al. 2005). However, a recent study
by Packer et al. (2011) showed that intensity of trophy
hunting is a significant factor in the decline of hunted
populations in Tanzania, indicating that poorly regulated
hunting practices can lead to trophy hunting having a
negative effect.
Results of a modeling study indicate trophy hunting
may be sustainable for some antelope species in some
areas of Africa (Caro et al. 2009), but the same study also
points out the main challenges of trophy hunting as a
conservation tool: limited or no time series of population
estimates and widely differing monitoring methods that
differ in precision and spatial extent (e.g., aerial survey,
foot census). Monitoring efforts must be sufficient to
detect relevant rates of change in the population size
within a meaningful period or they risk wasting valuable
resources (Hockley et al. 2005).
Individual resource user behavior has recently been
identified as one of the key uncertainties facing terres-
trial conservation (Keane et al. 2008) and fisheries (Ful-
ton et al. 2011) because compliance with rules depends
strongly on economic incentives and social and cultural
drivers. However, the extent of illegal offtake is hard to
quantify; thus, estimates are likely to be highly inaccurate
(but see St John et al. 2012 for novel methods to quantify
illegal behavior). For example, at the western edges of
the Serengeti, illegal bushmeat hunting is estimated to
be pursued by 8–57% of households, depending on the
study cited (Loibooki et al. 2002; Kaltenborn et al. 2005).
The extent of illegal offtake in trophy-hunting systems is
rarely considered, but illegal hunting (whether for tro-
phies or by local users for meat) is important to quantify
if sustainability of the system is to be maintained (Hilborn
et al. 2006).
When managers grant extraction rights to a relatively
small number of external users (e.g., safari companies,
fishing fleets), conflict is likely because local resource
users face restrictions on resource use, whereas others
are able to access these same resources. The challenges
of conflicts between different resource users have been
well documented in fisheries; illegal catch is widespread
(Agnew et al. 2009). Fisheries provide a good example
of how multiple stakeholders and their varied objectives
increase the complexity of management and make agree-
ment over and compliancewith rules difficult (Smith et al.
2008). For example, conservation stakeholders may pri-
oritize the conservation of the wider ecosystem, fisheries
managers the sustainable management of the harvestable
stock, commercial fishers the economic performance of
the fleet, and recreational fishers their satisfaction with
their fishing experience. Thus traditional strategies and
models optimizing against the objectives of a single stake-
holder are unlikely to produce consensus on manage-
ment approaches.
Themanagement strategy evaluation (MSE) framework
was developed first for fisheries and has been widely and
successfully used (Butterworth & Punt 1999). The main
strength of theMSE framework is its ability to testmanage-
ment decisions against various uncertainties, including
the population size of the stock and the level of illegal
offtake, by modeling the resource dynamics, monitoring
process, management decision making, and implemen-
tation within a unified framework (Butterworth & Punt
1999; Sainsbury et al. 2000). In fisheries, the application
of the MSE framework has also in many cases led to a
better commitment to the agreed procedure by all stake-
holders because of its transparency and ability to demon-
strate the effects of assumptions about all components
of a management system (Smith et al. 2008). Recently,
there have been proposals to extend the framework to
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include more realistic trade-offs between socioeconomic
and ecological sustainability through the explicit model-
ing of resource-user decision making (Little et al. 2009;
Milner-Gulland et al. 2010; Bunnefeld et al. 2011; Milner-
Gulland 2011) but this has not been tested for a terrestrial
system.
The mountain nyala antelope (Tragelaphus buxtoni)
is an ideal case study for exploring the role of trophy
hunting in combining conservation and economic inter-
ests in a developing country. It is listed as endangered
on the International Union for Conservation of Nature
Red List and is endemic to Ethiopia in Conservation In-
ternational’s Eastern Afromontane biodiversity hotspot
(Mittermeier et al. 2005). The species has been hunted for
trophies since 1968 (Safari Club International, personal
communication). Trophy-hunting data exist since 1996
and suggest an average revenue of US$2,251,000 over
15 years to the Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Sector
(Federal & Regional Governments). Themountain nyala’s
current population size is estimated to be just under 4000
individuals, and the population has come under increas-
ing pressure from legal trophy hunting, poaching, and
habitat loss (Atickem et al. 2011). Mountain nyala density
is 3.7 times higher in areas patrolled by game scouts
than in unpatrolled areas. These areas include the Bale
Mountains National Park and some controlled hunting
areas, where hunting companies invest in game scouts
(Atickem et al. 2011). This indicates illegal livestock graz-
ing and direct poaching by local people have a nega-
tive effect on mountain nyala densities. The Ethiopian
Wildlife Conservation Authority (EWCA) conducts yearly
monitoring to assess the nyala population size (a single
visit every 2 years to each hunting area), upon which it
bases its quota allocation. The allocation has been 14–
38 nyala from 1999 to 2009. The EWCA also collects a
trophy fee from individual hunters. The safari compa-
nies receive a daily fee from hunters, and EWCA sets
a minimum safari length of 21 days. A small number of
local people are employed as game scouts for the hunting
concession areas and support the logistics of the hunting
trips.
Inmost trophy-hunting situations such as for themoun-
tain nyala, there are 3 key stakeholders involved, govern-
ment, safari companies, and local people. We focused on
the decisionmaking of the government and accounted for
incentives of safari companies and local people through
different scenarios. The government strives to maximize
the quota (fees) and keep the risk of extirpation low.
The companies aim to maximize the quota and mini-
mize variability of quotas to plan ahead and attract safari
hunters. Safari companies are aware that they face un-
certain but potentially high losses through illegal offtake.
Thus, investment in activities reducing local poaching
(either law enforcement or positive incentives for local
communities) may indirectly increase quotas in the fu-
ture as population size increases. We focused on income
from trophy-hunting activities because most tourism in
Ethiopia is connected to its historical and cultural rich-
ness, such as ancient churches. Ecotourism is largely
undeveloped, especially in the Bale Mountains, due to
a lack of tourism infrastructure, planning, and marketing
(Admasu et al. 2011).
Traditional models of harvesting in terrestrial ecology
and conservation often assume that the quota is set as
a constant proportion of the estimated population size
(Lande et al. 1995), whereas fisheries scientists have de-
veloped adaptive harvesting rules that allow the quota
to be adjusted depending, for example, on previous quo-
tas and population trends (Rademeyer et al. 2007). We
sought to compare different strategies of quota setting
(constant, proportional, and adaptive harvesting rules)
the government can use to model offtake of a trophy-
hunted species under uncertainty. We built model sce-
narios to explore the roles of monitoring (to reduce
uncertainty in observed population size) and the level
of poaching on the ability to make informed decisions
and in determining system performance. Performance
is evaluated relative to population size, quota size, and
year-to-year variation in quota size, 3 measurements of
paramount importance to government and safari compa-
nies. A robust approach to setting a quota for species
that are of very high conservation and economic value,
but are difficult in terms of data availability and man-
agement capacity, could lead to major improvements
in the potential of trophy hunting as a conservation
tool.
Methods
Management Strategy Evaluation Submodels
The MSE modeling framework consists of 3 submodels.
(1) A model of mountain nyala population dynamics
(operating model) produces the “true” population dy-
namics. (2) The observation model relates the precision
of monitoring to the effort put into monitoring by the
government and the safari companies. (3) The govern-
ment model sets the quota through implementation of a
harvest-control rule that is based on the observed popula-
tion size (Fig. 1). Poaching occurs as an external driver in
the operating model, but the government is unaware of
the poaching rate when setting the quota. All simulations
were run for 50 years to keep the length realistic for man-
agement and 1000 iterations to account for stochasticity
in the model. The last 10 years of each simulation and
iteration were used as output.
The operating model was a stage-structured 2-sex ma-
trix model, in which population dynamics was updated
following annual monitoring. The model consisted of ju-
veniles (0–1 years), yearlings (1–2 years), and adults (2 to
>5 years):
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Figure 1. Diagram of the management strategy
evaluation framework for trophy hunting of nyala.
The population model produces the true population of
mountain nyala, the observation model mimics the
observation process, and the government makes the
decision on the basis of perceived population size. The
government then passes the quota on to the safari
companies who comply with the quota given by the
government. Poaching and the uncertainty in the
observation process are represented as diamonds
because they are part of the scenario analysis rather
than being internal to the model structure.
Table 1. Mountain nyala population dynamics modeled with a matrix
model with parameters (SD) from the literature.
Parameter Symbol Parameter Source
Survival yearling Sy 0.849 Owen-Smith 1990
Survival adult Sa 0.933 Owen-Smith 1990
Litter size K 0.944 Gaillard et al. 2000
Survival yearling SD 0.101 Owen-Smith 1990
Survival adult SD 0.061 Owen-Smith 1990
Fecundity SD 0.065 Gaillard et al. 2000
M =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0 SaF f,t 0 0 0 SaFm,t
ηS j 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 Sy Sa 0 0 0 0
ηS j 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 Sy 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 Sa 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 Sa Sa
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
(1)
where Sj, Sy, and Sa are survival rates of juveniles, year-
lings, and adults, respectively (Table 1), Ff,t is the fecun-
dity of adult females in year t, and Fm,t is the fecundity
for male nyala ≥5 years. In the absence of informa-
tion on nyala vital rates, we parameterized the model
with vital rates from a study on greater kudu (T. strep-
siceros), an ungulate of similar size (Owen-Smith 1990)
and general ungulate life-history parameters (Gaillard et
al. 1998). We followed Caswell and Weeks (1986) to
calculate the relative contribution of male and female
fecundity in polygynous mating systems (Supporting In-
formation). We assumed an equal sex ratio after birth
(η = 0.5). Density dependencewas included in themodel
by varying juvenile survival (Supporting Information).
Given the Population Vector N
N =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
J
F2
F3
M2
M3
M4
M5
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, (2)
where J is juveniles, F is females of 2 and 3 years old, and
M is males 2–5 years old, the transition between 1 year
and the next was calculated by multiplying the matrix
(Eq. 1) by the population vector
Nt+1 = MNt − ρNt , (3)
where ρ is proportion of population poached. The pop-
ulation size was reduced each year by ρ. Poaching rates
ranged from 0% to 12% and targeted all stage classes,
unlike trophy hunting which targeted only adult (old)
males.
Themodel was run for different degrees of observation
uncertainty. Coefficient of variation (CV) ranged from 1%
to 20%, which is similar to CVs reported in the literature
for large African mammals (Plumptre 2000). We assumed
a baseline CV of 15% for monitoring reflected the rel-
atively low investment in monitoring in this case study.
We used the CV to calculate the observed population size
from a normal distribution around the actual population
size N, a practice that is consistent with sampling theory.
The government sets the number of males hunted for
trophies. The quota is restricted to old males with a horn
size of 74 cm, which is thought to be reached at 5 years of
age (Evangelista et al. 2007). On the basis of discussions
with companies and EWCA, we assumed quotas were
implemented fully and without error. The government
does not know the poaching levels, and there is high
monitoring uncertainty; thus, the harvest-control rule is
based on highly uncertain and biased data.
Trophy Harvesting
We considered 3 types of trophy harvesting: constant,
proportional, and adaptive. For constant trophy hunting,
a constant number of mountain nyala were harvested ev-
ery year regardless of population size. Currently 30 nyala
are taken per year over the whole area, which suggests
this scenario is relatively realistic under current manage-
ment (EWCA, personal communication). The model was
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applied to a hypothetical hunting concession that holds
about one-third of the total nyala population. Thus, the
constant harvest quota in our MSE evaluation was 10
nyala/year taken from the class of males >5 years old.
In the case of proportional harvesting, the number of
harvested males >5 years old was determined by mul-
tiplying the observed population size by the percent
harvest rate and subtracting these individuals from the
number of males >5 years old. We tested harvest rates
from 0–5%; in the absence of illegal poaching and ob-
servation error the population reached extinction at a
harvest rate of >4.5% (Supporting Information). We used
the proportional harvest rate of 1.2% as the base case
because this equaled 10 nyala (old males) at the starting
population.
We used the adaptive harvest-control rule to calculate
the number harvested (H) in year t:
Ht =
(
t−1∑
t−y
H
y
)
(1 + δτ ), (4)
where the mean harvest over y years (sum of the nyala
harvest divided by the number of years over which the
harvest is considered) is multiplied by the degree to
which the harvest is allowed to change (δ) in response to
the change in observed population size (τ ). The change
in population size τ was found by fitting a linear model
through the observed population size over the number
of observation years (y) with maximum-likelihood tech-
niques. We call δ the flexibility parameter. For δ = 1,
the harvest changed at the same rate as the population,
whereas for δ = 0.5 the harvest changed at half that rate.
This harvest-control rule was adapted from the fisheries
literature (Rademeyer et al. 2008). Different values for
y and δ were explored (see below for more detail on
scenarios). Each simulation started with the current har-
vest of 10 males >5 years old. In fisheries this approach
is called an empirical harvest-control rule because it is
based directly on empirical data (past data of population
estimates and offtake) to set the quota. The second option
often used in fisheries is a model-based harvest-control
rule that implements a simulation model to predict future
population changes and makes decisions on the basis of
these predictions. We used an empirical harvest-control
rule because they aremore reliable in data-poor situations
when model fitting is problematic. They require lower
levels of computer power, allowing a more comprehen-
sive range of uncertainties to be explored, and there is a
higher probability of stakeholder buy in because they are
more likely to understand the decision making process
(Rademeyer et al. 2007).
Performance Metrics
The performance metrics were annual quota, average an-
nual variation (AAV) in the quota, population size, per-
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Figure 2. Mean population size for a range of levels of
poaching of nyala (percent offtake of the population)
for 1000 iterations over 10 years after deleting 40
years of results (horizontal lines, starting population
on the basis of current estimated population size).
centage of times the population went extinct out of 1000
replicates, and the CV of population size. We determined
these metrics over 10 years at the end of the simulation.
The AAV was calculated as (Rademeyer et al. 2008):
AAV = 1
q + 1
y+q∑
y
|Ht − Ht−1|, (5)
where H is the harvest and q the time span of years over
which the average was taken.
Scenarios
We first looked at the effect of different poaching levels
(1–10% of the population) to evaluate the most likely
current poaching rate given the life history of mountain
nyala and the current constant harvest level of 10 males
≥5 years old in a hypothetical hunting area. Density de-
pendence in the form of reduced survival of juveniles
produced a density at carrying capacity of 5075. At 7.5%
poaching, the population size was stable at 889 mountain
nyala, close to the estimated current population of 839,
after 50 years. The population went extinct when >10%
was poached (Fig. 2). On this basis, we assumed moun-
tain nyala populations can remain stable with a loss due
to poaching of 7.5% and 10 males ≥5 years old taken as
trophies each year. We took this as the baseline scenario
that best represented the current situation.
Law enforcement through patrolling leads to 3.7 times
higher mountain nyala population densities (Atickem
et al. 2011). We investigated the effectiveness of the rule
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for adaptive harvesting under different levels of moni-
toring uncertainty and poaching uncertainty. To do this,
we assumed companies were investing to some extent in
antipoaching efforts that reduced poaching from 7.5%
to 5%. We first tested the combination of a range of
years of data availability (2–18 years) and flexibility in
adaptive harvesting (δ = 0.0005 to δ = 0.02) in relation
to the performance metrics (annual quota, average AAV,
population size, percentage of times the population went
extinct out of 1000 replicates). We selected the combi-
nation of years of data availability and flexibility that best
balanced the different performance metrics for the next
step.
Three different harvesting approaches, an adaptive-
harvesting control rule (used mostly in fisheries), the
proportional harvesting mostly used in hunting, and a
constant harvest of 10 nyala were then evaluated for
a range of monitoring uncertainties (0.01–0.2 CV) and
levels of poaching (0–10% of total population) in relation
to the performance metrics.
Results
Years of Data Availability and Flexibility in Adaptive
Harvesting
There was a trade-off between the number of years of
monitoring and the flexibility in quota setting when
attempting to balance the competing aims of maximiz-
ing population size and quota, while keeping extinction
risk and year-to-year variability of the quota below an
acceptable level. More years of monitoring and lower
flexibility resulted in higher population size (Fig. 3a)
but the lowest quota (Fig. 3b). Highest quotas were
reached at higher flexibility and intermediate monitor-
ing lengths. Currently, there are 10 years of monitoring
data available, which if used to set an adaptive harvest-
control rule would lead to relatively high population sizes
and intermediate quota sizes when coupled with low-to-
intermediate flexibility (black rectangles in Figs. 3a &
3b). Decreasing poaching levels from 7.5% to 5% allowed
an increase in population size, an increase in quotas.With
a monitoring length of 10 years, a flexibility of 0.0025,
and a legal quota of 10 trophies per year, the population
size and the quota more than doubled (Figs. 3a & 3b).
Constant, Proportional, and Adaptive Harvesting
An increase in the CV of monitoring led to an increase
in AAV in the quota for both harvesting approaches, but
at high levels (CV = 20%) of monitoring uncertainty the
AAV was only 1 nyala/year for adaptive hunting com-
pared with a variation of more than 5 in the nyala quota
for proportional hunting (Fig. 4a). At these high levels
of uncertainty, the mean quota size was similar for both
strategies (Fig. 4b). However, the population was about
16% higher for the adaptive approach than for propor-
tional harvesting (Fig. 4c), and the CV of the popula-
tion size was slightly lower (Fig. 4d). Hence, under high
monitoring uncertainty the adaptive strategy minimized
annual variations in the quota while maintaining a higher
population size, when compared with a more standard
approach.
At a monitoring CV that is common for wildlife stud-
ies (15%), adaptive harvesting maintained a lower AAV
than proportional harvesting when flexibility was low
and when there were more years of available monitoring
data. With more flexibility and fewer years of monitor-
ing data, the AAV was higher for the adaptive than the
proportional strategy (Supporting Information).
At low poaching levels (1%), the adaptive strategy
lowered the quota AAV by up to 5 nyala/year (Fig. 5a)
but returned a quota size that was about 10 nyala lower
comparedwith proportional hunting (Fig. 5b). The popu-
lation size was similar among the adaptive, proportional,
and constant strategies (Fig. 5c). At high levels of poach-
ing (10%), the population went nearly extinct for all 3
strategies. The CV in population size was generally stable
for all 3 strategies, but it increased due to low population
size at high poaching rates (Fig. 5d).
Discussion
We demonstrate here the power of an MSE approach for
species that are trophy hunted. The framework enabled
us to consider the incentives faced by more than one
stakeholder (in this case, the government and safari com-
panies) and to compare the effects of different forms of
uncertainty on the performance of harvest-control rules.
The framework also allowed us to compare the effective-
ness of 2 different potential management activities that
improved population monitoring and reduced poaching
levels.
The comparison of harvesting strategies showed that
the adaptive approach outperformed proportional har-
vesting by reducing variation in the quotawhen poaching
occurred at an unknown level. Using data from previ-
ous years in the decision making process (in fisheries
an empirical data-driven harvest-control rule) means the
adaptive approach is more likely to respond to actual
population trends than to the noise inherent in annual
monitoring of population abundance. The year-to-year
variation in the quota is an often-overlooked measure-
ment of paramount importance formanagement planning
(both for safari companies and governments). A recent
simulation study on salmon fisheries showed that use
of multiple years of data decreased the variation in the
allowable fishing opportunity with only minor effects on
extinction risks (Winship et al. 2013). A constant harvest
would alleviate the problem of variation but would not
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Figure 3. The (a) population size (extinction risk <1% in all case, white area) and (b) quota of mountain nyala
(average annual variation <5 nyala per year, white area) for a range of length of monitoring years and
flexibility parameters (the magnitude by which the quota changes in relation to population change). The box
indicates the values chosen that balance the number of years of monitoring data used and flexibility of decision
making, taking into account the size of the quota, population size, extinction risk, and annual average variation
(AAV) of the quota.
allow for an increase of the trophy quota (and revenues)
even if the population could withstand a higher quota,
for example because of better monitoring or less poach-
ing (Figs. 4b & 5b). A quota-setting rule that minimizes
the quota variation (AAV) while enabling quotas to be
changed where appropriate would allow managers to
plan ahead and would encourage future investment in
conservation and management of trophy hunting.
The flexibility parameter (which determined how the
quota responded to the observed population trend) em-
bodies important management trade-offs: variability ver-
sus stability and harvest level versus population size.
Within fisheries science, flexibility parameters are tuned
to the management aims being addressed. For example,
the harvest rate for South African hake fishery (Merluc-
cuis capensis and M. paradoxus) is tuned to react more
quickly when the stock estimate shows a decreasing
trend and less quickly when the trend is increasing or
stable (Rademeyer et al. 2008). As monitoring proceeds
and longer periods become available, there is more scope
to alter the flexibility parameter in concert with the time
window of monitoring data that contributes to quota set-
ting to meet particular management objectives.
Ensuring that population and quota levels are main-
tained in the face of high levels of poaching is challenging,
thus it would be in the interests of safari companies to
support antipoaching activities (which is in fact what is
observed) (Atickem et al. 2011). However, if the CV of
monitoring >15%, this leads to potentially unacceptable
interannual variation in quotas. This suggests that if the
government is interested in maintaining system stability,
it would be worthwhile for them to invest enough in
monitoring to ensure the CV remains below 15%. And
although safari companies currently do not monitor, the
government does carry out a minimal level of monitoring.
Results of our analyses therefore suggest one potential
mechanism behind the observed behavior of 2 key stake-
holders in the system and illustrate the usefulness of the
MSE framework, which enables multiple viewpoints to
be modeled.
The projected improvements in quota from the current
level rely on poaching levels being substantially reduced
(from an estimated 7.5% to 5%). Experience from the
Serengeti (Hilborn et al. 2006) and from the Bale Moun-
tains itself show that law enforcement can be effective.
Patrolled hunting areas in the park had a 3.7 times higher
population size than unpatrolled areas (Atickem et al.
2011). Our model shows that the population size can be
up to 4 times higher in effectively patrolled areas with
<1% poaching compared with areas with high poaching
levels (up to 8%). Another way to reduce poaching would
be to transfer benefits from trophy hunting to the local
community. For example, in Tarangire National Park in
Tanzania, tourism and direct payments for habitat con-
servation led local people to set-aside land for conserva-
tion, whereas payments, such as donations, that are not
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Figure 4. Effect of changing the coefficient of variation of monitoring from 0 to 0.2 on (a) average annual
variation in quota, (b) quota size (number of nyala lost as a result of poaching included), (c) population size,
and (d) coefficient of variation of population size. Results from scenarios of adaptive, proportional, and constant
harvesting are shown.
conditional on actions were not successful as a conserva-
tion tool (Sachedina & Nelson 2010). This suggests that
a crucial next step in MSE development is to collect data
on local people’s decision making, land-use change, and
associated costs and to build these data explicitly into the
modeling framework, rather than, as here, incorporating
it implicitly in the form of a poaching rate (Milner-Gulland
2011).
Empirical studies have quantified the economic ben-
efits of trophy hunting. Results of these studies suggest
trophy hunting can be a valuable conservation tool (Lind-
sey et al. 2007). Ecological-economic models have also
shed light on the decision making trade-offs local people
face (e.g., between hunting and agriculture or between
risk of being caught and profits from hunting) (Bulte &
van Kooten 1999; Bulte & Horan 2003). A second type
of ecological-economic model focuses on the decision
making of a single agent balancing protection of land for
conservation and use of the land for agriculture (Bulte &
Horan 2003). Instead of optimizing the trade-off between
hunting, agriculture, and fines, this study focused on 2
major uncertainties in the management of trophy hunt-
ing. First, information on population size is often largely
uncertain due to imperfect monitoring (Butterworth &
Punt 1999), especially when funding is limited, as it is
in many parts of Africa (Balmford et al. 2004). Second,
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Figure 5. Effect of poaching of mountain nyala (percent offtake of the male population >5 years of age) on (a)
average annual variation in quota, (b) quota size, (c) population size, and (d) the coefficient of variation of
population size. Results from scenarios of adaptive, proportional, and constant harvesting are shown.
species that can be consumed or sold on markets often
face illegal and potentially high offtakes (Milner-Gulland
et al. 2003), but poaching levels are difficult to quantify
(Keane et al. 2008; St John et al. 2012). Here we found
that 10 years of population monitoring was sufficient to
develop sustainable strategies for management even un-
der continuing poaching. Thus, our approach contributes
to the current ecological-economic literature by focusing
on decision making under uncertainty, which has been
identified as one of the main developments needed to ad-
vance bioeconomic modeling and management of terres-
trial and marine economic-ecological systems (Bockstael
et al. 1995; Watzold et al. 2006; Winship et al. 2013).
Management and conservation decisions are always
made under uncertainty, and advances in conservation
decision making are hampered by not fully including
uncertainty in modeling studies (Langford et al. 2011).
The MSE framework has the potential to incorporate
the decision making processes of multiple stakehold-
ers into modeling of terrestrial wildlife management
and explicitly to include uncertainty in both monitor-
ing and implementation of conservation interventions
(Bunnefeld et al. 2011). This extends the single-objective
approach (maximum sustainable yield) often used to as-
sess the sustainability of exploitation to take into account
the objectives of multiple stakeholders. Thus, our study
Conservation Biology
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contributes to the ongoing debate concerning the poten-
tial for sustainable management of trophy hunting as a
tool for conservation of endangered species.
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